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Abstract: 
This paper examines spillover effects from education at the firm level, separating the effects 
for different levels and types of education and allowing for a curvilinear relationship. 
Modeling a Cobb-Douglas production function, we show that wages of tertiary-educated 
workers depend positively on the number of workers with an apprenticeship degree. These 
effects are the result of informational spillovers between differently educated workers. We 
estimate an aggregated Mincerian earnings equation using data from a large employer-
employee survey and account for firm fixed effects as well as endogeneous workforce 
composition. Our results are highly significant and robust throughout our specifications and 
show that the number of workers with an apprenticeship degree has a positive impact on 
average wages of tertiary-educated workers but with a decreasing rate.  
K eywords: Education, Informational Spillovers, Wages 
JE L-C lassification: I20, J24, J30 
*This study is partly funded by the Swiss Federal Office for Professional Education and Technology through its 
Leading House on the Economics of Education, Firm Behaviour and Training Policies. We would like to thank 
the Swiss Federal Statistical Office for data provision and Edward Lazear, Regina Riphahn, Dinand Webbink 
and the participants at the Colloquium on Personnel Economics in Zurich, the SASE in Madrid and in the 
research seminars at the University of Zurich for helpful comments. 
  
!"
"
Introduction 
Increasing investment in tertiary education is the main factor for sustainable growth in high 
technology countries (Aghion and Howitt 2006). An empirical study by Vandenbussche et al. 
(2004), using cross-country data, shows, that the importance of tertiary education for the 
growth of countries becomes higher with ???????????increasing proximity to the technological 
frontier. Therefore, national growth rates depend both on this proximity and on a ??????????
workforce composition. As the education??? ???????????? ??? ?? ?????? workforce is a major 
determinant of firm productivity, a change in the educational composition of the labor force 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????on ???????
productivity.  
A growing literature investigates the impact of an increase in average or tertiary education 
(i.e., the external or spillover effect) on productivity of firms or workers (e.g., Barth 2002, 
Battu et al. 2003, Bratti and Leombruni 2009, Martins and Jin 2010). These spillover effects 
are the result of worker interactions that lead to the sharing of knowledge and skills, thereby 
influencing both firm and worker productivity. While spillover effects at the firm level1 are 
significant, they vary substantially depending on the education of the workers they affect. For 
example, Martins and Jin (2010) find that spillover effects vary by level of education. 
Similarly, Wirz (2008) shows different effects by type of education. However, all these 
studies focus on the impact of average schooling within a firm or the average schooling of one 
part of the workforce.  
As the workforce of a firm usually represents a lot of different levels and types of education, 
the purpose of this study is to investigate spillover effects between these educational 
categories. In particular, given ?????????????????????????????????????????????? answering the 
question of whether the productivity effects of tertiary-educated workers depend on the 
educational composition of a firm workforce. Moreover, we consider the functional form of 
the spillover effects, which previous studies usually assume to be linear. One notable 
exception is Battu et al. (2003), who find a positive but decreasing return to co-workers? 
education but do not consider spillovers from different educational categories. 
As spillover effects are the result of worker interactions, we use a Cobb-Douglas production 
technology to model the wages of tertiary-educated workers. These wages reflect their 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
#"Further evidence for the existence of spillover effects can be found in studies using higher aggregation levels 
such as region (e.g., Ciccone and Peri 2006, Moretti 2004b, Rauch 1993) or industry (e.g., Kirby and Riley 2008, 
Sakellariou and Maysami 2004). 
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productivity, dependent on the educational composition of the workforce. Interaction and 
differences in knowledge are the main prerequisites for the occurrence of spillover effects. 
We allow for spillovers between both different levels and different types of education, an 
????????? ??????????? ????? ?????????? ???? ?????? ??????? ?????? ??? ?????????????? ??????????. 
Given that discussions on countrie??? ?????????? ???????????? ???????? inevitably include the 
question of whether a high percentage of workers with completed tertiary education or 
instead, a high percentage of workers with completed secondary vocational education2 
(apprenticeship graduates) is the main goal, we focus on these two educational categories in 
deriving our hypothesis. We hypothesize that tertiary-educated workers benefit from 
interacting with workers with apprenticeship degrees. This positive effect is the result of the 
differences in both the level and type of education that both categories of workers have.  
Furthermore, we test for a curvilinear relationship between the wages of tertiary-educated 
workers and the number of workers with apprenticeship degrees. We hypothesize that the 
return to an increase in the number of workers with apprenticeship degrees is positive but 
declining. Thus we extend the literature on spillover effects by considering spillover effects 
from lower to high levels of education and by allowing for a curvilinear relationship. 
To test our hypotheses, we aggregate worker data from the Swiss Earnings Structure Survey 
(ESS), a large employer-employee survey, to the firm level and estimate Mincerian earnings 
equations (Mincer 1974). The ESS is a perfect match for our empirical analysis, as the data 
???? ????????? ???????????? ??? ????????? ?????????? ???? ?????, and allows us to measure 
education by using educational degrees instead of years of schooling. An additional advantage 
of the data is the panel structure from the period 1998 to 2004 at the firm level. We use this 
panel structure to account for unobserved firm-specific effects that are potentially correlated 
with wages of tertiary-educated workers. These effects might bias OLS estimations. 
Furthermore we take the endogeneity of the number of workers with apprenticeship degrees 
into account by using a variable reflecting the tradition to train apprentices. As apprenticeship 
training is more widespread in German-speaking regions, we use the percentage of the 
German-speaking population in a region as instrument. 
Our results show that the effect from an increase in the number of workers with 
apprenticeship degrees on the wages of workers with tertiary education is positive but 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
!"A brief description of the quality and duration of secondary and tertiary education in Switzerland appears in the 
appendix. 
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declining. The effect is robust against the inclusion of regional, year, and industry controls, as 
well as firm controls.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical 
considerations and derives our hypotheses. Section 3 explains our estimation strategy, and 
Section 4 introduces the data set. Section 5 presents our empirical results, and Section 6 
concludes. 
Theory 
The productivity of highly educated workers depends on physical capital and the human 
capital of co-workers. Therefore, we model the productivity of tertiary-educated workers, as 
reflected by their wages, depending on the edu????????? ???????????? ??? ?? ?????? workforce, 
i.e., the number of workers with apprenticeship degrees. For simplicity, we omit physical 
capital in the production function, because the results remain unchanged and because our 
main interest lies in the workforce composition. We follow Moretti (2004a,b), who models 
city-level productivity using a Cobb-Douglas technology and who specifies two types of 
labor. Accordingly, we model firm-level productivity and use a similar specification:  
? ? ?????" " " " " " " " " " " (1)"
Where A is a productivity shifter, T and S denote the number of workers with a tertiary 
education and secondary vocational education (apprenticeship degree) respectively. We 
expect firms to have a linear labor cost function. For the minimization of labor costs (or 
equivalently the maximization of output) we calculate the partial derivatives ???? and 
??
?? of: 
? ? ???? ????? ? ???? ? ??????       (2) 
The first order conditions are given by: 
??
?? ? ?? ? ?????
????? ? ?        (3) 
??
?? ? ?? ? ?????
????? ? ?         (4) 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????marginal rate of substitution 
of tertiary-educated workers and workers with apprenticeship degrees: 
??
??
? ? ????           (5) 
&"
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Thus an increase in the number of workers with an apprenticeship degree increases the wages 
of tertiary-educated workers.  
As the Cobb-Douglas technology models firm productivity dependent on ???????? workforce, 
interaction among co-workers is implicitly assumed. One explanation for the influence of the 
number of apprenticeship graduates on the productivity of workers with a tertiary education is 
the existence of spillover effects.3 The main prerequisite for the existence of spillover effects 
is that workers interact and possess different knowledge (Jovanovic and Rob 1989). In their 
model on informational spillovers, Jovanovic and Rob (1989) argue that the exchange of 
different ideas between workers leads to an improvement of ideas or to imitation of the more 
valuable idea, depending on the degree of differences in knowledge of the interacting 
workers. The value of an idea is then measured as the return to the implementation. As 
differenc??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of spillover effects between tertiary-educated workers and apprenticeship graduates.  
Without changing the generality of the model, we assume that education, and thus the amount 
of general human capital that workers have, reflects the quality of ideas they possess, and we 
assume ideas to vary by both level and type of education. Given this assumption, we derive 
two directions of spillover effects. First, spillover effects occur if lower educated workers 
interact with higher educated workers and learn during the interaction. As a result, lower 
??????????????????????????????????????????This case is the one usually discussed as a spillover 
effect in the existing literature. Second?both in line with the derived marginal rate of 
substitution and the model on informational spillovers?spillover effects also occur in either 
direction if the type of education differs. As tertiary educated-workers and apprenticeship 
graduates in Switzerland differ in both level and type of education, they provide an ideal 
setting for testing whether higher-educated workers benefit from working with lower educated 
workers. Thus we derive our first hypothesis: 
H1: Workers with tertiary education benefit from interacting with workers with 
apprenticeship degrees. 
Although we expect tertiary-educated workers to benefit from interacting with apprenticeship 
graduates, we take a potential curvilinear effect into account. An increase in the number of 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
$"An alternative explanation for the positive impact of an increase in the number of apprenticeship graduates on 
the wages of workers with a tertiary education is imperfect substitution between workers with apprenticeship 
degrees and workers with tertiary education as shown in equation (5). However our analysis remains unchanged 
as we are interested in the impact on earnings an interaction with apprenticeship graduates has for tertiary 
educated workers."
'"
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similarly educated co-workers might have a different impact depending on the initial number 
of these co-workers. Therefore, drawing on the literature on private returns to education, we 
analyze the functional form of the external return to education. For private returns to 
education, the introduction of individual heterogeneity in the optimal schooling choice leads 
to a curvilinear functional form (which includes the linear relationship as a special case) (Card 
1999). For the external return to education, investigations of the functional form are quite rare 
and the assumption of strict linearity has hardly been challenged. However, we argue that the 
return to an increase in the number of workers with apprenticeship degrees is positive but 
declining. The reason is that an initial increase in the percentage of workers with 
apprenticeship degrees, which reflects the probability of an interaction with this category of 
workers, has a stronger impact on the growth rate of the percentage than any additional 
increase in the percentage of workers with apprenticeship degrees.  
Therefore, we expect the acquisition of new knowledge that improves ideas (in the sense of 
Jovanovic and Rob, 1989) to be positive but declining. We thus derive our second hypothesis: 
H2: The positive effects from workers with apprenticeship degrees on the wages of workers 
with tertiary education are declining. 
Estimation Strategy 
To investigate the relationship between wages and the educational composition of the 
workforce, we follow Martins and Jin (2010) and aggregate a Mincerian earnings equation to 
the firm-level. The reason is that we estimate the effect of an increase in the number of 
workers with apprenticeship degrees on the average wages of workers with tertiary education. 
Moreover a Mincerian earnings equation allows the inclusion of the squared number of 
apprenticeship graduates, so that we can test for a curvilinear relationship, that would not be 
possible if we directly derive our estimation equation from the Cobb-Douglas production 
function. 
In our first specification, shown in equation (6), we use the logarithm of firm average wages 
of tertiary-educated workers as dependent variable. After sorting workers into three categories 
(tertiary education, apprenticeship training, and other education), we calculate the number of 
workers belonging to each category for every firm. We use these three variables as our 
explanatory variables. The main explanatory variable in our equation is the number of 
("
"
workers with apprenticeship degrees. To test for a curvilinear relationship, we calculate the 
squared number of workers in each category. 
??? ? ???? ??? ???????????? ??? ????????????? ?????? ???? ???? ???? ?????  (6) 
We further add controls for average firm-specific characteristics denoted ???, such as average 
age, average tenure (and their squares), the percentage of male workers, and the percentage of 
part-time workers. ??, ?? and ?? are controls for region, industry, and year, respectively. Our 
first specification does not take into account factors that are time-invariant and potentially 
correlated with the educational composition of the firm. If these factors affect the wages of 
tertiary-educated workers, equation (6) would be inconsistent. The panel structure of our data 
set allows us to include firm fixed effects to overcome this problem. Equation (7) shows our 
second specification which includes firm fixed effects.  
??? ? ???? ??? ???????????? ??? ????????????? ?????? ???? ???? ?????   (7) 
To overcome potential endogeneity problems we use an instrument for the number of workers 
with apprenticeship degrees. The decision of a firm to train apprentices or to employ 
apprenticeship graduates is, besides economic factors, strongly related to tradition. The 
tradition to train apprentices is more widespread in German-speaking major regions than in 
non-German-speaking major regions.4 Being located in a German-speaking major region is 
therefore related to the employment of apprenticeship graduates. However the performance of 
tertiary educated workers does not depend on the language of the major region.  
For the IV estimation we use the percentage of the German-speaking population in the first 
stage to obtain predictions for the number of workers with apprenticeship degrees, we can 
include in the second stage. To avoid specification error, we only use a linear specification for 
our IV estimation. Regardless of the functional form, linear IV estimates contains an average 
effect analogous to the local average treatment effect (LATE) (Angrist and Krueger 2001).  
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
%"The categorization of being German-speaking is unambiguously possible for six out of seven major regions in 
Switzerland. One major region, Espace Mittelland, has a high language heterogeneity (three French-speaking 
and two German-speaking cantons). As our sample has no information on the location of firms in 2002 and 2004 
on cantonal level, we use observation from 1994 and the panel structure of our data set to categorize firms in 
2002 and 2004. This procedure is rather reliable because of the low mobility of firms in Switzerland. We assign 
the cantonal percentage of the German-speaking population to firms which have observations in 1994, 1998 or 
2000. We assign the percentage of the German-speaking population of Espace Mittelland to firms which do not 
have observations in 1994, 1998 or 2000."
)"
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Furthermore the use of firm-level data requires a correction of the standard errors for 
clustering at the firm-level. Therefore we use cluster-robust standard errors (Moulton 1990) in 
our estimations.  
Data 
For our empirical analysis, we use the Swiss Earning Structure Survey (ESS), a representative 
data set conducted biennially by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. This data is well-suited 
for our analysis because it contains information on individual characteristics (e.g., wages, 
education, tenure) and firm-level attributes (e.g., firm size, industry, and region). We 
aggregate the data to the firm level to generate a firm panel that allows us to control for time 
and firm-specific fixed effects. We use data from 1998 through 2004.  
Table 1: Descriptive statistics (firm level) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Log average gross monthly wage 25519 8.794 0.233 8.019 9.829 
Log average gross monthly wage of tert. educ. 25519 9.050 0.275 7.956 9.929 
Tertiary educated workers 25519 13.507 68.566 1 2679 
Workers with apprenticship degree 25519 28.966 122.166 0 6388 
Workers with other education 25519 17.045 105.749 0 5667 
Firm size 25519 59.518 249.525 5 9973 
Male 25519 0.599 0.261 0 1 
Tenure 25519 8.208 4.026 0 34.800 
Tenure squared 25519 83.572 80.811 0 1211.040 
Age 25519 40.999 4.732 22.273 63.200 
Age sqared 25519 1703.335 387.991 496.074 3994.240 
Parttime 25519 0.265 0.268 0 1 
Region 25519 3.392 1.907 1 7 
Industry 25519 8.444 3.800 3 15 
Year 25519 2002.235 1.776 1998 2004 
Source: Swiss Earning Structure Survey 1998-2004; own calculations. 
Before aggregating the data we restrict our sample in the following way: As we assume that 
wages in the public sector are both less flexible than in the private sector and dependent on 
cantonal wage contracts, we restrict our sample to companies in the private sector. For the 
calculation of the firm-average wages of workers with a tertiary education, we focus on 
workers aged 25 to 60.5 Given the estimation with a fixed time and firm-specific effect, all 
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
&"Workers younger than 25 are unlikely to be university graduates, whereas workers older than 60 are likely to 
receive retirement offers before reaching the retirement age of 65. Workers older than 60 are assumed to be a 
heterogeneous group as some workers continue working even if they receive offers for early retirement. 
Therefore we use only the wages of workers aged 25 to 60. To calculate the educational composition of the 
*"
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firms observed only once during the observation period, are excluded, as well as firms 
switching the industry. As we are interested in the wages of tertiary-educated workers, we 
restrict our data set to firms employing at least five workers and at least one worker with a 
tertiary education. After these restrictions, we aggregate our dataset. Table 1 shows the 
descriptive statistics.   
Our dependent variable is the log of firm average monthly gross wages of workers with 
tertiary education. We use real wages (2005 = 100) for our analysis. The ESS contains 
information on the highest educational degree, which we summarize in these three educational 
categories as follows: Workers belong to the first category (tertiary education) if they are 
graduates of one of the federal institutes of technology, a university, a university of applied 
science6, a pedagogical university, or a higher vocational school. Workers belong to the 
second category (apprenticeship) if they have completed apprenticeship training. Workers 
belong to the third category (other education) if they have completed only high school, have a 
foreign?not classifiable?education, or have only a middle school education.  
Additionally, we include several control variables aggregated at the firm level. We aggregate 
for each firm and year the following individual variables to the firm level: being male 
(dummy), age and age squared (in years), tenure and tenure squared (in years), and working 
part-time (dummy). At this level we also include industry, region, and year (all categorial). 
Results 
To test our hypotheses, we first estimate equation (6). Then we add firm fixed effects to 
control for omitted time-invariant variables possibly correlated with the education of the 
workforce and the average wages of tertiary-educated workers and estimate equation (7). For 
each estimation model we include the control variables stepwise. Furthermore, we provide 
some robustness checks by using an instrumental variable approach.  
Ordinary least squares estimates 
Table 2 provides the OLS estimates for testing our hypotheses. According to hypothesis 1 
(H1), we expect a positive effect from an increase in the number of workers with 
apprenticeship degrees on the wages of workers with tertiary education. Moreover, according 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
workforce, we release the prior restriction to obtain a more precise number for the working environment of the 
workers in our sample."
'"A University of applied science offers 3-year Bachelor and 5-year Master-programms containing more practical 
education in comparison to universities or Federal institutes of Technology which offer more theoretical 
education."
#+"
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to hypothesis 2 (H2), we expect that the return to an increase in the number of workers with 
apprenticeship degrees is positive but declining. As the results are robust throughout the 
different specifications, we focus on specification 5, which includes the full set of control 
variables (table 2).  
Table 2: O LS Regressions 
OLS Regressions Spec. (1) Spec. (2) Spec. (3) Spec. (4) Spec. (5) 
Dep. Var.: Log firm av. Monthly wages tertiary educated     
Number of workers with:      
Tertiary Education 0.0002*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Apprenticeship 0.0003*** 0.0002*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Other -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** -0.0000 -0.0000 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Sq. number of workers with:     
Tertiary Education -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Apprenticeship -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Other 0.0000** 0.0000** 0.0000** -0.0000 -0.0000 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Controls:      
Firm characteristics No yes yes yes yes 
Regional controls No no yes yes yes 
Industry controls No no no yes yes 
Year controls No no no no yes 
R-squared 0.006 0.060 0.097 0.186 0.186 
N 25519 25519 25519 25519 25519 
Notes: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%, OLS Regressions with cluster corrected 
standard errors. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
The number of workers with apprenticeship degrees shows a positive and statistically 
significant value. The wages of workers with tertiary education rise as the number of workers 
with apprenticeship degrees rise. This finding confirms our first hypothesis (H1) and shows 
that the productivity, measured as wages, of a tertiary educated worker depends positively on 
the number of differently educated workers. Learning not only takes place from higher levels 
of education to lower levels but also depends on the difference in the types of education 
between co-workers. As workers with apprenticeship degrees are highly qualified workers, we 
assume that workers with a tertiary education learn from suggestions or feedback from 
apprenticeship graduates on how to implement new ideas. In contrast, an increase in the 
##"
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number of workers with other education shows a negative effect on the wages of workers with 
tertiary education.  
To investigate whether the positive effect of apprenticeship graduates on the wages of 
workers with tertiary education is linear, we include the squared number of apprenticeship 
graduates in a firm in our estimation equation. The results show a negative and statistically 
significant value of the squared number of apprenticeship graduates on the wages of workers 
with tertiary education. These results are in line with our second hypothesis (H2). 
In addition to the effect of apprenticeship graduates on the wages of workers with tertiary 
education, we investigate whether apprenticeship graduates have a positive effect on the total 
firm productivity measured as average wages of a firm. Considering the theoretical 
predictions by Aghion and Howitt (2006), we expect a negative effect of all primary- and 
secondary-educated workers on firm productivity, whereas workers with tertiary education are 
predicted to have a positive impact on overall firm productivity. As Switzerland is close to the 
technological frontier and thus has a rather low rate of tertiary-educated workers compared to 
other European countries, an increase in the employment of tertiary-educated workers reflects 
an increasing innovative power and thus a productivity increase (Bildungsbericht Schweiz 
2010, World Bank 2009). The results from this estimation appear in the appendix in Table 
B.1. The estimation results show, that an increase in the number of tertiary-educated workers 
results in a higher overall firm productivity, whereas an increase in the number of workers 
with apprenticeship degrees results in a lower overall firm productivity. Combining the results 
of both regressions, we note that while tertiary-educated workers have a positive impact on 
firm productivity, their wage depends strongly on the number of highly qualified 
apprenticeship graduates employed within a firm. 
Although we include a full set of control variables in specification (5) in Table 2, our results 
could be biased due to omitted time-invariant variables correlated with both average wages of 
tertiary-educated workers and the educational composition of a firm. In the next section, to 
capture unobserved time-invariant variables at the firm level, we include a firm-level fixed 
effect in our equations. 
Ordinary least squares estimates with firm-fixed effects 
Table 3 shows the estimation results of equation (7). In the first column we include no control 
variables at the firm level. As the results are robust against the inclusion of firm-level control 
variables, we focus on specification 2. The results confirm the results of Table 2, i.e., the 
#!"
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results where we do not control for firm fixed effects. The impact of an increase in the 
number of workers with apprenticeship degrees on wages of workers with tertiary education is 
positive and statistically significant. These findings support our first hypothesis (H1).  
Table 3: F E-Estimates 
FE Model Spec. (1) Spec. (2) 
Dep. Var.: Log firm av. Monthly wages tertiary educated 
Number of workers with:   
Tertiary Education -0.0006*** -0.0006*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Apprenticeship 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Other 0.0000 0.0000 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Sq. number of workers with:  
Tertiary Education 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Apprenticeship -0.0000*** -0.0000*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Other 0.0000 0.0000 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Controls   
Firm characteristics No yes 
R-squared 0.004 0.018 
N 25519 25519 
Notes: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%, OLS Regressions with firm fixed effects 
and cluster corrected standard errors. Standard errors are in parentheses."
Furthermore the results show that the coefficient of the squared number of apprenticeship 
graduates within a firm remains negative and highly significant. These results support the 
robustness of the previous specifications against time invariant factors, which are potentially 
correlated with firm-specific educational composition and tertiary-?????????????????????????
As we expected from the theory on informational spillovers, workers with tertiary education 
benefit from interacting with workers with apprenticeship degrees. While tertiary-educated 
workers have a high theoretical knowledge, the knowledge of workers with apprenticeship 
degrees is more practical. Both categories of workers have completed a high quality education 
and are specialists in their fields. Suggestions and feedback from workers with an 
apprenticeship degree enhance the wage of tertiary educated workers.  
Furthermore we test whether the effect of workers with apprenticeship degrees on total firm 
productivity remains robust to the inclusion of a firm fixed effect. The results from the 
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previous section show that an increase in the number of tertiary educated workers results in a 
higher overall firm productivity, while an increase in the number of workers with 
apprenticeship degrees results in a lower overall firm productivity. Table B.2 in the appendix 
shows, that an increase in the number of tertiary educated workers has still a positive impact 
on overall firm productivity, whereas the impact of an increase in the number of workers with 
apprenticeship degrees is insignificant. These results support the findings of the previous 
section: Workers with tertiary education have a positive impact on total firm productivity, but 
their wages depend on the number of workers with apprenticeship degrees. 
Robustness check: Instrumental variable estimate. 
As a robustness check we conduct an instrumental variable estimation. Unobservable 
variables correlated with both the log average wage of tertiary educated workers and the 
number of apprenticeship graduates within a firm might bias the OLS and fixed effects 
estimations. We use the percentage of the German-speaking population as defined in the 
Estimation Strategy section as instrument for the number of workers with apprenticeship 
degrees.  
Table 4: I V Estimation 
IV Estimation First Stage Second Stage 
Dep var: Number of workers with 
apprenticeship  
 Log firm av. monthly 
wages tertiary educated   
Number of workers with:   
Tertiary Education  1.0901*** -0.0023 
 (0.1634) (0.0015) 
Apprenticeship  0.0021 
  (0.0013) 
Other  0.3858*** -0.0008 
  (0.0637) (0.0005) 
Instrument:   
German-speaking region 19.5546***  
  (6.1623)   
Controls:   
Firm characteristics yes yes 
Regional controls yes yes 
Industry controls yes yes 
Year controls yes yes 
N 25519 25519 
F-statistic: First stage 37.47 37.47 
Notes: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%, IV Regressions with cluster corrected 
standard errors. Standard errors are in parentheses."
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Table 4 shows the first and second stage results from our IV estimation. The problem of weak 
instruments does not occur in our estimation, because the value of the F-statistic of the first 
stage is above 10 (Stock et al. 2002). Moreover the results of the first stage show, that the 
effect of the percentage of the German-speaking population on the number of workers with 
apprenticeship degrees is positive and highly significant. Firms being located in German-
speaking major regions employ more workers with apprenticeship degrees than firms being 
located in non-German-speaking major regions. Although this effect does not arise from a 
change in a dummy variable as in the case of the LATE, the interpretation is analogous 
(Angrist and Krueger 2001). Only those firms which would change their employment 
behavior dependent on language and traditional influences of the location are represented by 
the IV estimates.  
The second stage estimation results show, as expected from theory, a positive effect for the 
number of workers with apprenticeship degrees on wages of workers with tertiary education. 
This estimate has a p-value, which is slightly above the 10 percent level and is therefore 
insignificant. Nevertheless the positive sign and the proximity of the p-value to the 10 percent 
level of the IV estimate indicate together with the results from the OLS and FE estimations 
that we still can support our first hypothesis. 
Discussion 
This paper analyzes the impact of the educational composition of the workforce on wages of 
workers with tertiary education. Our results show that an increase in the number of workers 
with apprenticeship degrees has a positive effect on the wage of workers with tertiary 
education but with a decreasing rate. The results remain robust against the inclusion of several 
control variables such as regional, industry and year controls. Furthermore, the results are 
stable if we include a firm fixed effect. Thus we conclude that workers who are university 
graduates not only serve but also benefit from the knowledge of workers with different 
qualifications.  
Our findings are in line with the theoretical predictions derived from a Cobb-Douglas 
technology and ?????????? ?????????? ????????????? ??? ????????????? spillover effects. One 
possible explanation for the dependence of the wages of tertiary-educated workers on the 
number of apprenticeship graduates is the presence of spillover effects. Differences not only 
in the level of education but also in the type of education determine the spillover effect. 
Tertiary-educated workers and apprenticeship graduates differ in type and level of education. 
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Both categories of workers are highly qualified to perform their tasks. While workers with 
tertiary educations are assumed to possess rather theoretical knowledge, workers with 
apprenticeship training?in contrast?possess more practical and operative knowledge. For 
example tertiary-educated workers might learn from apprenticeship graduates how to enhance 
the implementation of a new technology into the existing one. Our results thus indicate that a 
combination of the knowledge sets is very useful. 
Our results lead to several policy implications. An increase in the employment of tertiary 
educated workers, as recommended by Aghion and Howitt (2006), requires at the same time 
the employment of highly qualified workers with a secondary education. Any stronger 
emphasis on tertiary education should not neglect the importance of investment in the training 
of workers with secondary education. Workers with an apprenticeship training are not only 
highly qualified workers with professional knowledge but also contribute to the wage of 
workers with a tertiary education. Moreover, the goal of increasing the number of workers 
with a tertiary education is reasonable only as long as the job requirements increase 
accordingly. Otherwise, these workers might be matched with jobs for which they are 
inaccurately qualified or even overqualified. A stronger emphasis on secondary vocational 
education could solve this problem. 
Future research on spillover effects should consider both the type and level of education and 
take into account a curvilinear relationship. Although our method controls for potential 
endogeneity of the workforce composition, our IV cannot support our first hypothesis at 
conventional significance levels. Nevertheless, our findings suggest that spillover effects 
depend not only on the highest or average level of education but also on the difference 
???????????????????????-??????????????????s. 
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Appendix A 
"
Swiss Educational System 
In Switzerland, compulsory education ends after 9 years of schooling. Students then have the 
choice of continuing their education either on an academic or vocational education path. For 
the academic path, which leads to a university admission certificate, an admissions test is 
required (Bildungsbericht Schweiz 2010, p.126). The vocational path leads to an 
apprenticeship degree and combines over 2-4 years of on-the-job training with theoretical 
education. Apprentices usually have 3-4 days per week of on-the-job training and 1-2 days per 
week of theoretical education. The structure of the training and the centralized final 
examination (both theoretical and practical) makes apprenticeship within an occupation 
comparable across firms.  
Completed upper secondary education is the prerequisite for beginning tertiary education. 
Both tertiary education and upper secondary education have an academic and a vocational 
path. While switching from an academic upper secondary path to a tertiary vocational path or 
vice versa is possible, these changes require admissions tests. The tertiary academic path 
entails education at either a university or at one of the two Federal Institutes of Technology. 
Graduates from these institutions can continue their education at the doctoral level. Students 
with an upper secondary academic background enter tertiary academic education without 
needing to take an admissions test. The tertiary vocational path entails education at either 
universities of applied sciences (e.g., arts, humanities, etc.), pedagogical universities, or 
higher vocational schools and takes 3-5 years of studying. Students with an upper secondary 
vocational background do not have to take the admission test. With certain restrictions 
graduation from a university of applied science or a pedagogical university entitles the 
graduate to begin a doctoral program at a university or a Federal Institute of Technology 
depending on the quality of the completed education.  
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Appendix B 
Table B .1: O LS Regressions 
OLS Regressions Spec. (1) Spec. (2) Spec. (3) Spec. (4) Spec. (5) 
Dep. Var.: Log firm av. Monthly wages         
Number of workers with:      
Tertiary Education 0.0021*** 0.0021*** 0.0020*** 0.0014*** 0.0014*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Apprenticeship -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0002*** -0.0002*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Other -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** 
  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Sq. number of workers with:     
Tertiary Education -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Apprenticeship 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Other 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Controls:      
Firm characteristics no yes yes yes yes 
Regional controls no no yes yes yes 
Industry controls no no no yes yes 
Year controls no no no no yes 
R-squared 0.065 0.094 0.157 0.387 0.387 
N 25519 25519 25519 25519 25519 
Notes: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%, OLS Regressions with cluster corrected 
standard errors. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table B .2: F E Model 
FE Model Spec. (1) Spec. (2) 
Dep. Var.: Log firm av. Monthly wages   
Number of workers with:   
Tertiary Education 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Apprenticeship -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Other -0.0002*** -0.0002*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Sq. number of workers with:  
Tertiary Education -0.0000*** -0.0000*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Apprenticeship 0.0000* 0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Other 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Controls:   
Firm characteristics no yes 
R-squared 0.007 0.061 
N 25519 25519 
Notes: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%, OLS Regressions with firm fixed effects 
and cluster corrected standard errors. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
